The rail transportation system in South Korea is very crucial, helping Koreans commute quickly from one place to another. Especially, after the opening of the Korea Train eXpress (KTX) in 2004, the extensive high-speed rail network has connected many major cities in South Korea. Since the Super Rapid Train (SRT) competing with KTX was launched in 2016, the bullet train network service has been further expanded and busier. The high-speed rail network has increased the annual passenger numbers from 0.9 billion to 1.5 billion for the past 15 years. Punctuality and predictability of the advanced rail transportation system has made passengers expect higher level of safety and comfortability. However, faulty maintenance or minor human errors could lead to devastating consequences. A series of recent railway accidents have fueled public disappointment and concerns over the safety of high-speed rail network. Last year for example, there were 69 railway accidents and 166 operational errors along the rail network in South Korea.

On November 20, 2018, KTX-414 heading to Seoul had to stop near Osong Station due to power failure, which caused 703 passengers trapped in the dark and non-moving train for about 3½ hours. This accident further delayed more than 120 trains for about 8 hours, affecting around 10,000 travelers. On December 8, 2018, Seoul-bound KTX-Sancheon408 on the Gangneung-Railroad derailed 5km from Gangneung Station. All of the 10 cars of the bullet train were completely derailed into a zigzag form, injuring 15 passengers, and operations on Gangneung ~ Jinbu route were halted for two days. This derailment was one of the ten railway accidents that occurred within only a few weeks after the KTX-414's power failure accident.

As a result of a series of accidents in late 2018, Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI) in South Korea extensively conducted a public-interest audit on the overall rail safety management system. BAI reported the results in August 2019 after auditing Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MOLIT), Korea Railroad Corp. (KORAIL), Korea Rail Network Authority (KR), Korea Transportation Safety Authority (TS), and Korea Railroad Research Institute (KRRI). The audit report identified 38 illegal and unfair events, and recommended the anticipated actions to take. Nevertheless, further studies are required to find the fundamental and long-term solution to improve the safety of high-speed rail network in South Korea.

It is widely recognized that a railway accident is a result of multiple causes such as construction defects, poor maintenance, non-compliance with operating procedure, and human errors. The KTX-414's power failure accident near Osong Station originated from the defective installation of catenary, where loosely connected catenary and contact wire hit the pantograph of the train, leading to the short circuit and power failure. Non-compliance with regulations and insensitivity to safety are the typical causes of the accident. Moreover, passengers should have been promptly evacuated because the average restoration time is known to be two hours when the contact wire is broken. It took actually 1 hour 40 minutes until the power supply was restored and KORAIL let the relief train leave the scene immediately without confirming the normal operation of KTX-414. Unfortunately, KORAIL realized there was a severe damage in the pantograph and the train still failed to operate despite the power restoration. After all, the relief train had to be called again, having the passengers trapped in the train for about 3½ hours in total. In other words, rescue efforts were enormously delayed by a lack of prompt action and accurate communication between KORAIL and emergency responders.

Aforementioned derailment of KTX-Sancheon408 was caused by the combination of improperly-wired railroad switch system and its negligent inspections. It was the recurrence of a similar accident near Gwangmyeong Station in 2011, where the derailment was also attributed to equipment mishandling and improper maintenance. More fundamental problem lies in that responsibility is separated for the railway construction (by KR) and its maintenance (by KORAIL), often raising an issue over the completion of facility handover/takeover, leading to buck-passing between KR and KORAIL.

Improvement in safety of high-speed rail network requires a continuous endeavor in multiple areas. It is necessary to enhance the safety management through realistic safety measures. The field staff's roles must be well-documented, and their work records (including images/videos) must be well-managed to clarify the responsibilities. Stricter regulations must be implemented to prevent human errors or negligence. For the effective emergency response and rescue activities, a safety manual must be detailed and emergency drills must be held at both expected and unexpected times.

It is also recommendable to reinforce the railway inspection system for KORAIL and KR under supervision of MOLIT and in cooperation with TS and KRRI. To improve the maintenance of high-speed rolling stocks, it is necessary to undergo rigorous inspections regularly, especially for aging high-speed rolling stocks. The maintenance records and spare parts inventory must be properly managed for the timely replacement of parts, which is essential to preventing breakdowns of rolling stocks.

To overcome the aforementioned problem arising from the separation of responsibilities for the railway construction (by KR) and its maintenance (by KORAIL), it is necessary for KORAIL and KR to build a collaborative life-cycle maintenance system. Besides, it may be desirable to restructure the maintenance responsibility in such a way that KORAIL focuses on the maintenance of rolling stocks, delegating the maintenance of other facilities to KR. Moreover, there is a criticism of KORAIL’s authority over railway traffic control. Because KORAIL (as transport service provider) tends to give higher priority to the operational efficiency and profitability over safety, it is recommended that a third party take charge of the traffic control to strengthen the railway safety.

Because construction of rail infrastructure takes a long time from its planning to execution, design changes are inevitable to reflect possible changes during construction e.g., changes in passenger demand or those in transportation and environmental policy. Design flaws in rail infrastructure could lead to catastrophic consequences such as deadly collapse of rail bridges or tunnels. Therefore, whenever design changes are necessary, corresponding construction plans must be thoroughly reviewed in order to meet the safety requirements. If a construction plan raises any safety concerns, then it should not be implemented under any circumstances.

As a long-range plan, it is recommendable to establish a Rail Safety Research Center conducting comprehensive and innovative research and development (R&D) for the preemptive rail safety management. Such R&D may include maintenance standardization and risk-assessment for rail infrastructure; IoT-based intelligent rail safety management system; damage prediction model for disaster risk and its damage to rail operations; and safety monitoring based on big-data and AI technology for disaster prevention, etc.